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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Abstract: In New Zealand, assessment of ‘significance’ is undertaken to give effect to a legal requirement for local 
authorities to provide for protection of significant sites under the Resource Management Act (1991). The ambiguity 
of the statute enables different interests to define significance according to their goals: vested interests (developers), 
local authorities, and non-vested interests in pursuit of protection of environmental public goods may advance different 
definitions. We examine two sets of criteria used for assessment of significance for biological diversity under the Act. 
Criteria adapted from the 1980s Protected Natural Areas Programme are inadequate to achieve the maintenance of 
biological diversity if ranking is used to identify only highest priority sites. Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) propose 
a narrow definition of significance, and criteria that identify only a few high-quality sites as significant. Both sets are 
likely to serve the interests of developers and local authorities, but place the penalty of uncertainty on non-vested 
interests seeking to maintain biological diversity, and are likely to exacerbate the decline of biological diversity and the 
loss of landscape-scale processes required for its persistence. When adopting criteria for assessment of significance, 
we suggest local authorities should consider whose interests are served by different criteria sets, and who will bear 
the penalty of uncertainty regarding biological diversity outcomes. They should also ask whether significance criteria 
are adequate, and sufficiently robust to the uncertainty inherent in the assessment of natural values, to halt the decline 
of indigenous biological diversity.___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Keywords: collective action; conservation evaluation; interests; precautionary principle; representativeness; 
uncertainty
Introduction
Significance assessment in the RMA
In New Zealand, the Resource Management Act (1991) 
(hereafter RMA) is the major statute for agency-based 
decision-makers determining whether indigenous habitats 
and ecosystems on private land may be cleared or protected 
against harm. Assessment of ‘significance’ is central to 
this determination. Agencies with statutory functions 
under the Act are required by Section 6(c), as a matter 
‘of national importance’, to recognise and provide for the 
protection of ‘areas of significant indigenous vegetation 
and significant habitats of indigenous fauna’. This 
responsibility is assigned to local authorities (territorial 
authorities, regional councils and unitary authorities), who 
must provide for the protection of significant areas in their 
districts or regions. Section 6(c) is not the only part of 
the RMA relating to the maintenance and protection of 
indigenous biological diversity (see for example §5(2)(b), 
§7(d), §30, and §31) but is particularly important because 
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developers may be granted consent to destroy or modify 
sites deemed not to contain significant values, or when 
negative impacts on significant sites are considered to be 
adequately mitigated.
New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy goal for indigenous 
biodiversity
The worldwide decline of biological diversity is a result 
of loss and simplification of ecosystems by human 
activities and intensive land uses. Habitat destruction 
results in total loss of some ecosystem and habitat types 
from landscapes, and degrades ecosystem functions 
and processes through fragmentation and the removal 
of ecological connections, sequences, and ecotones. 
Depending on the species, it may take a substantial length 
of time before adverse consequences of ecosystem and 
habitat loss and fragmentation affect local and regional 
species richness (Helm et al. 2006). As Tilman et al. (1994) 
put it: ‘because such extinctions occur generations after 
fragmentation, they represent a debt—a future ecological 
cost of current habitat destruction’. 
Most of New Zealand’s coastal, lowland, and montane 
terrestrial environments have undergone extensive 
clearance and modification of indigenous ecosystems, and 
loss has been extreme (>90%) in environments over nearly 
a quarter of the total land area (Walker et al. 2006).  These 
landscapes are committed to further loss of biological 
diversity. Ongoing clearance of indigenous habitat (Green 
& Clarkson 2005; Walker et al. 2006) will exacerbate 
the loss and ‘…the more fragmented a habitat already is, 
the greater is the number of extinctions caused by added 
destruction’ (Tilman et al. 1994). Pests and weeds (‘our 
second historical legacy’; Ministry for the Environment 
(MfE) 1997) compound this problem.
The ongoing loss of New Zealand’s indigenous 
biological diversity has recently been the subject of a 
national strategy (the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy 
or NZBS; DOC & MfE 2000), which also represents New 
Zealand’s obligation under the international Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Goal Three of the NZBS is to ‘Halt 
the decline of New Zealand’s indigenous biodiversity’. 
The NZBS addresses all branches, levels, and agencies 
of government in New Zealand (p. 127). It identifies local 
authorities as key players in its implementation (p. 120) 
and assigns responsibility to them for a range of specific 
actions (e.g. pp. 41–44: land; 52–54: freshwater; 96–97: 
Maori; 102–103: community participation and awareness; 
111–113: information, knowledge and capacity). The 
NZBS observes (p. 37): ‘[RMA] provisions to promote 
the protection of significant indigenous vegetation and 
habitats have not been effectively implemented across 
New Zealand’. One explanation offered is ‘difficulties 
in defining the meaning of “significant”’.
In this paper, we discuss the source of these difficulties. 
Our approach combines theoretical perspectives from both 
ecological and social science. More specifically, we follow 
Brower (2008) in combining several theories about how 
interests compete in public policy debates (Downs 1957; 
Schattschneider 1960; Olson 1965; Stone 2001; McFarland 
2004). We begin by considering that these difficulties 
arise from ambiguity in the RMA. In general, we argue 
that there are many ways to define significance legally 
and technically; and each interest group is likely to define 
significance differently, in a manner consistent with its 
goals (whether those goals be development, jobs, water 
provision, biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, 
or heritage conservation). Similar to Salzman and Ruhl 
(2000), we describe the various interests involved 
in significance assessment. We then take two sets of 
significance assessment criteria as cases for examination. 
We ask the following questions: Who benefits? Who loses? 
Who bears the cost and the risk of something going awry? 
Will these criteria maintain indigenous biological diversity 
in New Zealand, or will they exacerbate its loss?
Difficulties in defining the 
meaning of significance
Ambiguity in the RMA
Some assert that there are ‘objective and neutral standards 
of evaluation that…come from a vantage point outside 
politics, untainted by the interests of political players’ 
(Stone 2001, p. 12). However, many others have recognised 
that analytical standards used to define problems, set policy 
goals, and assess solutions are neither neutral nor objective, 
but politically constructed (e.g. Stone 2001, p. xii).
There are few policy areas more contentious than the 
ability of individuals and corporations to exploit, modify, 
or destroy natural resources. In politically polarised 
areas such as these, public-policy makers and legislators 
may employ ambiguity to achieve general acceptance 
(Palmer 1995, pp. 61–62; Stone 2001, pp.157–162, 243–-
245; Pardy 2005, p. 34). Ambiguity yields statutes and 
regulations obscure enough to please all parties, vague 
enough to be unenforcable, and so ill-defined that failures 
to implement the policy will be difficult to detect and 
impossible to litigate. Ambiguous policies sound lofty 
but may accomplish little (Edelman 1960).
Murray and Swaffield (1994) illuminate four 
foundational ‘myths’ of the RMA. First, they suggest the 
term ‘resource’ is culturally constructed (an ecological 
entity only takes meaning as a resource when it has been 
classified and recognised for potential use by humans) 
and anachronistic (evoking familiar, positive images 
of a cultural heritage based on resource exploitation). 
They point out that the term ‘resource’ departs from the 
ecological view of ecosystems as complex, interdependent 
webs (rather than discrete exploitable elements) and hides 
the threat this ecological view poses for development 
interests ‘in so far as it may require stronger limits on 
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resource exploitation’ (p. 49). Next, they propose that 
the term ‘sustainable management’ enables a diversity 
of irreconcilably different interests to express support for 
shared ideals (e.g. ‘wellbeing’, ‘responsibility to future 
generations’; also see Noss 1991) while maintaining their 
own particular interpretations of its meaning (see Saunders 
1990; Elder 1991, p. 834; Gowdy 2000; Kashian 2005, 
p. 1026). Third, they suggest that the RMA advances the 
myth of ‘integration’, and evades acknowledgment of the 
‘critical tradeoffs’ (p. 50) required to undertake use and 
development while meeting needs of future generations, 
safeguarding ecosystems, and avoiding adverse effects 
on the environment. Fourth, they make the case that the 
RMA espouses the anachronistic ‘1960s myth’ of rational 
decision-making (see also Stone 2001, pp. 12 & 232–257) 
and ‘disguises the socially contentious nature of both 
scientific prediction and rational planning’ (Murray & 
Swaffield 1994, p. 50). In practice, RMA trade-offs are 
often mentioned (but in positive terms, e.g. ‘balance’), 
and discretionary, subjective, case-by-case decisions about 
balance are supported by neither objective environmental 
bottom lines nor substantive rights for affected parties 
(Pardy 1997, 2005; Armstrong 2001).
The RMA is consistently and ‘remarkably’ (Murray 
& Swaffield 1994, p. 50) evasive on just how its 
fundamental conflicts are to be reconciled, and (following 
a pattern often observed in ambiguous statutes; Stone 
2001, p. 43) devolves the resolution of these conflicts to 
local government. The RMA provides no definition of 
‘significance’. In its absence, different interests may write 
their different interpretations of significance, and those 
interpretations can and do vary considerably.
Interests in determining significance 
Competing interests 
Determination of significance under the RMA usually 
involves three factions: vested interests (interests with 
a measurable financial stake in the outcome of a policy 
decision), agencies, and non-vested-interest parties. These 
parties (groups of individuals that are not necessarily 
organised, referred to as ‘interests’) have different goals, 
and according to their vision of what is best, each interest is 
likely to propose different definitions and solutions (Stone 
2001, p. 12). Our analysis of interests below relies on the 
assumptions of rational choice theory (e.g. Downs 1957): 
that an individual is informed enough to determine what 
her goals are, rational in her thoughts and competent in 
her actions, and will act in a way to further her goals.
 
Vested interests
Where developers have a financial interest in gaining 
approval (resource consent) to exploit, destroy, or 
modify indigenous ecosystems and species, they and 
their advocates are vested interests. In the process of 
significance assessment, vested development interests seek 
development consent and the ensuing profit. Their primary 
interest is not protection of the environment and biological 
diversity, but development (Salzman & Ruhl 2000, p. 675). 
Indeed in many cases, protection of biological diversity 
will stand in direct conflict with development. 
The vested development interest will prefer a narrow 
definition of significance that sets high bars or thresholds; 
in other words, they are likely to advocate for significance 
criteria that are difficult to attain. Narrow definitions are 
also attractive to the development interest because they 
set high thresholds for the recognition of environmental 
harm. If significance and seriousness of harm are difficult 
to establish, little will be off-limits to development.
In advocating for narrow significance criteria, which 
place the burden of proof of environmental harm elsewhere, 
vested interests often assert that their enterprise is public 
spirited and that their preferred outcome adds to social, 
economic and/or cultural well-being. Stone (2001, p. 
29) describes this as ‘classic political strategy, captured 
in the famous assertion by Charles Wilson that “what’s 
good for General Motors is good for the country”’. When 
defending their stance, advocates of narrow criteria may 
also strategically attempt to contain an issue by defining it 
in narrow terms, failing to mention (or even denying) links 
to other problems, and treating the issue in isolation (e.g. 
Schattschneider 1960; Pralle 2006, pp. 15–16). Finally, 
they may attempt to limit participation and restrict access 
to the debate, e.g. by defining a high level of expertise as a 
requirement to participate in the debate (see Schattscheider 
1960; Pralle 2006, p. 51).
Local authorities 
Local authorities (district and regional councils and unitary 
authorities) are elected, and many expect them to act on 
behalf of a broad range of constituents, despite much 
evidence that this is the exception rather than the norm 
(e.g. Downs 1957; Niskanen 1971). For example, some 
might expect local authorities, given their statutory role, 
to maximise a public good such as biological diversity by 
minimising development consents that adversely affect 
it. In actuality, developers and regulatory authorities 
often want the same thing (see Salzman & Ruhl 2000) 
and their interests and desires often differ from those of 
their electorate (see Downs 1957). The coincidence of 
interests between developers, elected officials, and public 
agency staff is so frequent and flagrant that there is a 
rich lexicon of common phrases (e.g. the fox guarding 
the henhouse) and various technical terms to describe 
it (co-optation and agency capture (Selznick 1949); the 
iron triangle (McConnell 1966; Lowi 1979); regulatory 
capture (Levine 1998)).
There are many reasons why developers, councillors, 
and local authority staff would favour development – and 
hence narrow definitions of significance that set high bars 
or thresholds – at the expense of biological diversity. 
Local authorities may favour such criteria in part because 
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loss of biological diversity is less measurable (Green & 
Clarkson 2005) and visible than local or regional economic 
growth. Also, consents may function as ‘political steam 
valves’ (Salzman & Ruhl 2000, p. 678) that dissipate 
pressures on agencies from vested interests in such forms 
as litigation or public pressure through media attention. 
Criteria that simplify assessment and reduce the scope 
of what is significant may also be attractive for local 
authorities because this will minimise their assessment, 
conservation, and protection duties. Thus, without 
implying that this outcome is universal (in practice there 
is considerable variation in this area, and some councils 
have comprehensive inclusive significance criteria), or 
that corruption, conspiracy, or intentional collusion are 
to blame, there are persuasive reasons why both agencies 
and developers may promote narrow significance criteria, 
even when this means environmental harm (Salzman & 
Ruhl 2000, p. 678). 
Non-vested biodiversity protection interests
Those wishing to maintain biological diversity have little 
or no financial stake in the outcome. These non-vested 
interests would prefer criteria that are broad enough 
to include the full suite of features that are (or may 
be) important for maintaining and restoring biological 
diversity into the future. 
Because natural systems are exceptionally complex, 
and knowledge is incomplete, assessment of biodiversity 
‘value’ (the degree of importance for maintaining 
biological diversity) will remain uncertain and imprecise 
(Myers 1993). The preference of the non-vested 
biodiversity interest is for significance assessment criteria 
that are robust to this uncertainty (‘robustly fair’ in the 
sense of Moilanen et al. (2008), that the probability of net 
environmental harm is small). Such criteria would reliably 
err on the side of caution, applying the precautionary 
principle (Raffensperger & Tickner 1999) to place the 
burden of uncertainty of harm in the issuing of consents 
on the developer. This requires thresholds for significance 
assessment that are inclusive and low, rather than exclusive 
and high.
Two sets of significance criteria 
To what extent have the different desires and interpretations 
of different interests shaped definitions of significance 
for biological diversity in New Zealand? To answer this 
question, we next examine two sets of criteria that have 
been used to determine the significance of indigenous 
biological diversity in relation to Section 6(c) of the RMA. 
We discuss how they have expressed their different ideals, 
goals and problems – and the adequacy of their solutions 
for achieving the maintenance of biological diversity.
Criteria from the PNAP: ‘An urgent task of national 
importance’
New Zealand’s Protected Natural Areas Programme 
(hereafter PNAP) commenced in the 1980s as an 
emergency response to visible and rapid disappearance 
of indigenous landscapes, habitats, and communities 
caused by government subsidies for land development 
in the 1970s and early 1980s (Kelly 1980; Kelly & Park 
1986). Criteria for ecological evaluation used in the PNAP 
(Myers et al. 1987) drew on earlier work in New Zealand 
and research in Europe and North America (e.g. Ratcliffe 
1971, 1977; Tans 1974; Gehlback 1975) and have been 
adapted for assessment of ‘significance’ under the RMA 
by Whaley et al. (1995) and others. 
Criteria were used to evaluate natural areas in the 
PNAP in two phases: the first phase involved rapid 
ecological survey of ecological districts (McEwen 1987) 
to identify what natural areas remained, while the second 
phase ranked the areas to identify the ‘best, or most 
representative’ examples as priorities for protection (Kelly 
& Park 1986, pp. 26, 43). There is a manifest tension 
between the two phases.
The goal of the PNAP derives from the Reserves 
Act (1977) ‘...ensuring, as far as possible, the survival 
of all indigenous species of fauna and flora, both rare 
and commonplace, in their natural communities and 
habitats…’. Kelly & Park (1986, p. 28) articulated this 
goal as maintaining ‘natural characteristics, component 
species and gene pools, and ecological and evolutionary 
processes’. 
The principal PNAP criteria (representativeness, 
rarity and special features) seem to attempt to address this 
goal and the problem of rapid clearance and decline. They 
are inclusive in scope. For example, when interpreting 
representativeness, Kelly & Park (1986) were concerned 
with maintaining natural ecological processes and patterns 
in time and space, including typical and commonplace 
ecosystems, as well as the rare and threatened. They 
recognised the importance of maintaining ‘ecological 
patterns that occur along the major environmental gradients 
of a district’, ‘places where ecological succession will 
eventually lead to a vegetation approximating the original’, 
and ‘vegetation that has been substantially modified’ (p. 
28). They interpreted the concept of ‘original’ according to 
an enabling ‘longer view’ as ‘things taken together [that] 
make New Zealand distinctive’ (p. 29). The rarity and 
special features criterion was broad, including distinctive 
‘communities’, ‘ecotones, mosaics and sequences etc.’ 
(Myers et al. 1987, p. 60). The scientists developing the 
PNAP criteria also engaged explicitly with the problem 
of reserve adequacy and minimum areas: Kelly (1980, p. 
80) proposed that where possible a high-quality ‘10% of 
the original area of each broad landscape and habitat class 
should be preserved’. We note that Kelly (1980, p. 80) 
accepted that protection of such a modest proportion would 
ultimately halve the variety of species able to survive.
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However, second-phase PNAP criteria address the 
different problem of how to accommodate development 
interests. The solution was to rank sites and focus attention 
on ‘best examples’ – encapsulated in the slogan ‘Help 
Protect the Best of What Remains’ (Commission for the 
Environment 1985). Kelly and others recognised a direct 
conflict between ranking and the goal of persistence, and 
stated their discomfort, e.g.
There is widespread fear in conservation circles that selection 
or ‘ranking’ procedures tend to focus on the few best natural 
areas, and cast aside the rest as unimportant. We believe this 
fear is a real one. Ideally, the PNA Programme should facilitate 
landscape conservation by presenting information that illustrates 
the landscape value of all natural areas, particularly in those 
districts where few natural areas remain. In practice, however, 
the pressure of market forces requires a selection to be made. 
There is, in fact, an implicit risk that the PNA Programme could 
actually work against the quality of the overall natural landscape 
of a district, if in its implementation, its focus was only on the 
few top priority places for representative reservation (Kelly & 
Park 1986, p. 26).
Despite those ideals and concerns (see also Myers et al. 
1987, p. 56), secondary ranking criteria (naturalness, 
long-term ecological viability, size and shape, buffering 
and surrounding landscape) were applied in the PNAP to 
exclude all but the ‘best, or most representative examples’ 
(Kelly & Park 1986, p. 26), a ‘key site’ and/or ‘at least 
one adequate sample’ (Kelly 1980, p. 85). Representative 
value of an ecological unit was considered to be high if 
<10% of that type remained (Myers et al. 1987, p. 67), but 
there was no stated goal to protect the minimum baseline 
suggested by Kelly (1980) of 10% of original extent of 
each ecosystem type. In application, the PNAP, at least 
in the 1980s, focused on the ‘highest rated sites’ of each 
type as ‘priorities for future conservation effort’ (Myers 
et al. 1987, p. 73).
The priority-site approach, and PNAP secondary 
criteria, were applied less strictly in later PNAP surveys, 
due to increased awareness of the scarcity of indigenous 
biological diversity in many landscapes, and better 
scientific understanding of the importance of even small 
and modified habitat remnants; for example for the 
survival of mobile species such as kererū (e.g. Clout & 
Craig 1998; Spurr & Anderson 2004) and invertebrates 
(e.g. Kuschel 1990). Yet where PNAP criteria have been 
adapted for significance assessment in the RMA, the ‘best 
examples’ idea appears often to have been adopted without 
questioning its adequacy or suitability for maintaining 
biological diversity. For example, local authorities 
have applied both inclusive and ranking criteria from 
the PNAP to identify significant sites, while elsewhere 
PNAP priority-site lists have been transferred wholesale 
to schedules of significant sites. In these cases, the tacit 
goal of significance assessment is unlikely to be the 
maintenance of biological diversity, and more likely to be 
the minimisation of transaction costs for local authorities 
and accommodation of development interests.
Criteria from Norton & Roper-Lindsay (2004): ‘The 
cream philosophy’ 
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) proposed a different 
set of significance assessment criteria for the RMA. As 
they explained, their proposal (‘the cream philosophy’) 
is based on their vision of an ideal world:
In an ideal world we believe sites identified as being ecologically 
significant…should be the cream of the District or Region’s 
biodiversity values—the best areas containing high biodiversity 
values and exhibiting a good range of healthy ecosystem 
processes. The threshold for each criterion should therefore 
be high. Accordingly there may be very few or even no sites 
identified as SNAs [Significant Natural Areas] on private land in 
an area where there has been widespread and intensive damage 
or loss of biodiversity values (such as the Waikato, perhaps?) 
(Roper-Lindsay & Norton 2005, p. 3).
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) do not discuss the 
goal of maintaining indigenous biological diversity for 
present and future generations. The NZBS, which pre-
dates their paper by four years, is not mentioned, nor is the 
problem of global or national loss of biological diversity, 
nor its causes. As their goal Norton and Roper-Lindsay 
(2004) most often refer to ‘sustainable management’ 
(pp. 295, 298). But as Murray and Swaffield (1994, p. 
49) would predict, theirs is a ‘particular’ interpretation 
of this ambiguous term. Use and development appear to 
be included, but protection is not envisaged, at least not 
if protection entails discontinuation of land uses such as 
grazing (p. 297). Although no limitation on protection 
from harm is prescribed in the RMA or judicial precedent, 
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) represent such a form 
of protection (‘reservation’) as ‘lock-up’ (p. 298).
The problem for significance assessment identified by 
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004, p. 295) is to evaluate the 
relative importance of the ‘values’ at one site compared 
with another. In other words, the problem they perceive 
is how to exclude some areas that may be important for 
maintaining indigenous biological diversity, in order to 
identify a set of priority areas, which they suggest are the 
only significant areas. They do not mention long-term 
maintenance of ecosystems and indigenous biological 
diversity, nor explain how their criteria will be adequate 
to sustain and safeguard biological diversity now and in 
future. In a later explanation (Roper-Lindsay & Norton 
2005, p. 4) they appear to recommend that these goals, 
problems and purposes of the Act are dealt with by other, 
unspecified, ‘more comprehensive approaches’.
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) propose four 
significance criteria as a solution to their goal and problem. 
Their first criterion (rarity and distinctiveness) is not 
inclusive but is restricted to species. They propose that a site 
is significant only if it contains a species that is classified 
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as acutely threatened and hence close to extinction (i.e. 
nationally critical, nationally endangered, or nationally 
vulnerable; Molloy et al. 2002), a species at (and not just 
near) its national distribution limit, and that is endemic, 
or particularly uncommon in the study area (they do not 
define ‘study area’). 
The representativeness criterion of Norton and Roper-
Lindsay (2004) is restricted to ecosystems already reduced 
to extreme scarcity in the landscape. They must also be 
‘natural’ ecosystems (pp. 299, 300), which for them means 
having occurred in New Zealand ‘prior to recent human 
impacts’. No definitive threshold for scarcity is suggested. 
Once an expert has judged that an ecosystem is ‘natural’ and 
reduced to less than 10–20% of its subjectively assessed 
former extent, they propose it would be more valuable 
(and less expedient) for an expert to consider the ‘size 
and spatial arrangement of the individual patches…when 
deciding which areas are significant’. The third criterion 
of Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) (ecological context) 
might identify as significant many areas that are important 
for the maintenance of biological diversity. 
It may matter little whether sites exceed recommended 
thresholds and meet qualifications for significance in the 
first three criteria or not, for Norton and Roper-Lindsay 
(2004) then propose sustainability as an overriding 
qualifier. They propose the only significant sites are places 
where an expert deems the ecosystem to be ‘working 
normally’, with ‘ability to retain the ecological values 
that have been identified’ (p. 301). If ‘working normally’ 
is interpreted by the expert as proximity to a state ‘prior 
to recent human impacts’, it is most unlikely that any 
ecosystem reduced to scarcity (representative by their 
criterion), or supporting species that are acutely threatened 
(rare and distinctive by their criterion), would be regarded 
as significant.
Thus, the criteria of Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) 
seem to be well designed to achieve an ‘ideal world’ 
where relatively few or possibly no sites are identified 
as significant. If sites deemed non-significant by these 
criteria were to be cleared, very little would remain of 
biological diversity in a local authority district.
Discussion
Equity in significance assessment for biodiversity
…discussion among ecologists about ecological criteria to 
ensure that assessment focuses on ecological matters and not 
management or politics is good (Roper-Lindsay & Norton 
2005, p. 4).
Development interests often have a strong, monetary 
incentive and , though few in number, are likely to dominate 
through superior organisation and persistence (this is ‘the 
logic of collective action’; Olson 1965). Devolution of 
responsibility for significance assessment to numerous 
local authorities will promote this predisposition, for 
three reasons. First, devolution to local levels is likely 
to keep debate off the national radar, and hence contain 
the scope of debate (Pralle 2006, p. 29), which will tend 
to favour the status quo (Schattschneider 1960). Second, 
decentralisation tends to privilege local needs over 
national goals (see Duane 1997; Koontz 2002, cited in 
Pralle 2006, pp. 207–209), so vested interests are more 
likely to find sympathy at local authority levels than at 
the national level. Third, case-by-case definition resulting 
from devolution will make it more costly for a dispersed, 
non-vested interest to challenge development proposals 
and significance definitions. 
Economics and political science thus predict that, on 
balance, preferences of vested development interests will 
dominate definitions of significance assessment emerging 
under regional and local devolution. They also predict that 
to limit public attention the vested interest will prefer that 
significance assessment is perceived as a narrow issue, 
restricted to ecological, not political, matters and limited 
to a comparison of one site versus another to determine 
whether or not it is ‘the cream’ within a district. In contrast, 
it would suit the goal of the non-vested interest to broaden 
the question and participation – to relate significance 
assessment for biological diversity to national and global 
concerns about its decline (Schattschneider 1960; see also 
Pralle 2006, p. 23).
We propose that the very first questions local 
authorities should consider when adopting biodiversity 
significance criteria involve equity – and therefore politics. 
They are: (1) ‘Whose interest do these particular criteria 
serve?’ and (2) ‘Where do these criteria place the penalty 
of uncertainty?’
Whose interest do these criteria serve?
Narrow definitions of significance such as that proposed by 
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) leave little off-limits to 
development. Assessments using ranking to identify best 
examples (‘the cream’) will also suit vested development 
interests. Authors of the PNAP criteria acknowledged the 
function of secondary (ranking) criteria to accommodate 
development interests, and stated their fear these would 
work against the future survival of ecosystems and 
species across the landscape. In contrast, Roper-Lindsay 
and Norton (2005) propose that ‘the cream philosophy’ 
will benefit biological diversity (and by extension non-
vested interests who would prefer that biodiversity was 
maintained), because having many ‘significant’ sites 
might encourage local authorities to ‘have no interest in 
management of areas outside the sites’. 
We are not persuaded that what’s good for developers 
is likely to be good for the country’s biological diversity, 
or fair to those who prefer it maintained. Some of our 
misgivings involve the uncertainty burden, which we 
discuss shortly. But first, we explain on ecological grounds 
why broad, inclusive, and precautionary significance 
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criteria would better serve the goals of non-vested interests 
wishing to maintain biological diversity. 
We suggest biodiversity significance criteria serving 
vested interests can be recognised by two features: (1) 
high bars for significance and/or (2) qualifiers that are 
irrelevant to the goal of maintaining biological diversity, 
but would compromise this goal if disqualified sites 
were modified or destroyed by development. Pernicious 
qualifiers include:
(1) A requirement to rank sites and identify best 
examples. Whether or not a particular fragment is the 
‘best example’ (Kelly & Park 1986, p. 26; Myers et al. 
1987, p. 68) or ‘the cream’ (Norton & Roper-Lindsay 
2004, p. 296; Roper-Lindsay & Norton 2005, p. 3) is 
irrelevant to the question of whether it is important 
for maintenance and persistence of biological 
diversity. Progressive elimination of less pristine 
remaining ecosystems in a fragmented landscape will 
compromise natural processes required for ecosystem 
and species persistence, and contribute strongly to 
the ongoing decline in biological diversity (Tilman 
et al. 1994; Cabeza & Moilanen 2001, 2003). A ‘best 
examples’ approach overlooks important biological 
diversity sustained by often small, highly modified 
remnants (Kuschel 1990; Clout & Craig 1998; Spurr & 
Anderson 2004). Finally, ‘best examples’, ‘the cream’, 
and ranking or scoring approaches all conflict with 
modern conservation planning principles developed 
internationally for efficient and effective conservation 
(Margules & Pressey 2000). They are inefficient 
because ‘the cream’ is usually a suite of intact but 
similar sites, rather than a full range of diversity 
(Pressey & Nicholls 1989), and they are ineffective 
because they give priority for protection to the habitats 
and species least vulnerable to threatening processes 
(see also (3) below).
(2) A significant site must be able to retain its values 
indefinitely. This idea, proposed as a ranking criterion 
by Myers et al. (1987) and promulgated by Norton 
& Roper-Lindsay (2004), seems to pre-date modern 
landscape and metapopulation ecology paradigms. As 
elaborated by Wallington et al. (2005), it perpetuates 
an outdated equilibrium concept and overlooks 
modern understanding of ecosystems and populations 
in landscapes as dynamic (non-equilibrium; e.g. 
DeAngelis & Waterhouse 1987) and interdependent 
(e.g. Hanski 1998). Because local species populations 
persist in a balance between extinction and colonisation 
of different habitat patches, and ecosystems are not 
naturally stable but change through time, there is no 
reason to expect particular values (e.g. a population 
of a species) to persist at a given site over ecological 
or evolutionary time, nor is persistence at a given site 
necessary to the survival and continued evolution of 
a species, population, or ecosystem. Survival and 
continued evolution of a species (its ‘potential…
to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations’ (RMA §5)) may well depend on the 
protection of current habitat at a given site that may 
not sustain it at some point in the future. Currently 
unoccupied and transiently used habitats are also 
important. For example, Hanski (1998) states: 
‘Managers should absorb the key message of classic 
metapopulation dynamics: currently unoccupied 
habitat fragments may be critical for long-term 
persistence.’ 
Indigenous remnants in fragmented landscapes can 
be expected to lose species directionally (Tilman et al. 
1994). Sustaining biodiversity here requires halting 
loss and restoring ecosystems; further loss reinforces 
and propagates the extinction debt being paid off. 
But the ‘sustainability’ and ‘long-term ecological 
viability’ qualifiers of Norton and Roper-Lindsay 
(2004) seem to suggest it may be wasteful, rather 
than ecologically prudent, to protect sites unlikely 
to retain certain values in future. History shows the 
idea that a resource unexploited is a resource wasted 
is a powerful idea (Hays 1959) with destructive 
consequences in natural resource management (e.g. in 
forestry ‘sustainable management’; Langston 1995). 
In this case, a ‘sustainability’ criterion ‘making the 
link to “sustainable management”’ (Norton & Roper-
Lindsay 2004, p. 298) appears to promote a feedback 
loop that grows extinction debt. We note that in 2004 
the Environment Court rejected sustainability as a 
significance criterion (RMA A128-2004 [62–63])
(3) An ecosystem must be, or resemble, one that 
existed ‘prior to recent human impacts’. This qualifier 
is also irrelevant to assessing a site’s importance 
for maintaining biological diversity now and in the 
future. Ecosystems closely resembling pre-settlement 
states typically have little potential for commercial 
use and are cheaply available, but the biological 
diversity represented may be less urgently in need 
of protection from development than that in more 
modified ecosystems. Setting aside the question of 
whether any present ecosystem now remains in a 
state existing ‘prior to recent human impacts’, it is 
certainly important to protect sites that remain in 
‘healthy functioning states’ (see (5) below). However, 
maintaining a high proportion of New Zealand’s 
indigenous biological diversity, and particularly 
its most threatened species, often depends on the 
maintenance of highly modified (and usually more 
imminently threatened) ecosystems and habitats in 
landscapes where there is little or no trace of primary 
(i.e. pre-settlement) ecosystem character. Seral 
ecosystems, habitats, and communities, whether or 
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not resembling those prior to human settlement, are 
essential – and arguably the most important and major 
contributors in many places – for the maintenance of 
New Zealand’s biological diversity today and into 
the future. They comprise diverse assemblages of 
indigenous species, provide habitat for the substantial 
portion of the indigenous biota that is absent from 
primary or old-growth communities, and their future 
recovery is needed to ameliorate the extinction debt 
in the landscape incurred by past habitat loss. This 
may be why Kelly & Park (1986, p. 28) suggested it 
‘would be wise to take a broad and enabling view of 
the concept “natural”’.
(4) A species must be acutely threatened, at the edge 
of its distribution, or endemic to that particular area 
for its habitat to warrant protection. Extinction debts 
may be paid off, and species predicaments revealed, 
many decades after the damage is done (e.g. Helm et 
al. 2006; Vellend et al. 2006). If the goal is to maintain 
biological diversity, it is necessary to protect and 
enhance habitats of species recognised to be declining, 
naturally rare, and/or locally endemic across their 
natural range before their decline becomes irreversible. 
High thresholds and qualifiers, such as those proposed 
by Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) for rarity and 
distinctiveness, provide a rationale to disregard 
the likely effects of ongoing clearance of many 
such species, including accelerated or precipitated 
declines, reduced genetic diversity (i.e. within-species 
biological diversity), lowered likelihood of long-term 
persistence, and/or loss of tractable opportunities for 
population recovery.
(5) A habitat or ecosystem type must be reduced to 
dire scarcity (e.g. 10–20% of its former extent). New 
Zealand’s cooler, wetter, steeper and more remote 
environments have not been the primary focus of 
resource exploitation in the past. Protection of the less 
reduced primary and seral ecosystem types remaining 
in these places is fundamental to the maintenance of 
biological diversity, including the continued evolution 
of genetic and ecological diversity. Unlike those now 
reduced to scarcity, less reduced ecosystem types often 
form part of linked or intact elevation sequences and/or 
have less obstructed natural processes (e.g. pollination, 
seed dispersal, nutrient and moisture cycles, seasonal 
feeding and migration patterns, breeding, dispersal). 
Among other things, they provide habitats for species 
that require larger and more contiguous areas (e.g. 
large-bodied, host-dependent, narrow-range and/or 
habitat-specialist species), and sensitive species that 
require habitat that is of relatively high quality and/
or buffered from pests or weeds. They may contain 
‘source’ areas that some species populations depend 
upon for persistence although they range or disperse 
more widely (to ‘sink’ areas) and may use them only 
intermittently (e.g. important breeding areas, seasonal 
food sources, migration paths), so their removal can 
have disproportionate adverse flow-on effects. 
Where do these criteria place the penalty of 
uncertainty?
In salient respects, [the precautionary principle] applies to 
biodiversity more than to any other environmental problem 
(Myers 1993, p. 74).
In assessing significance for biological diversity, 
uncertainty needs to be managed by adopting precautionary, 
inclusive, and attainable criteria (low bars) if the goal is 
to guard against irreversible harm (Myers 1993; Kriebel 
et al. 2001).
As described above, environmental harm is invited by 
using high thresholds (or bars) and pernicious qualifiers 
to exclude all but ‘the cream’ from a suite of sites 
recognised to deserve protection. High thresholds and 
qualifiers also place the burden of uncertainty (e.g. the 
risk that development or unsympathetic use will harm or 
reduce biological diversity) not on the developer, but on 
the non-vested interest seeking to maintain biodiversity. 
In other words, narrow exclusive criteria may be ‘robust’ 
(Norton & Roper-Lindsay 2004, p. 303) to the uncertainty 
of obtaining a consent for development or use (which is 
costly to business). However, they will not satisfy the 
desire of the non-vested biodiversity interest for criteria 
that are ‘robust’ in the sense of being unlikely to deliver 
unfavourable outcomes for biodiversity (Moilanen et 
al. 2008).
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004; Roper-Lindsay & 
Norton 2005) also propose that the non-vested interest 
should bear the burden of two further, important, sources 
of uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty associated with 
consigning maintenance of biological diversity to a ‘more 
open’ yet undefined, and in most local authority districts 
non-existent, ‘comprehensive system for protection 
and management of biodiversity’ (Roper-Lindsay & 
Norton 2005, pp. 3–4), in place of the protection of a 
comprehensive set of significant sites. ‘Community buy 
in’ (p. 3) for the maintenance and restoration of indigenous 
biological diversity is important, and local authorities may 
(and some do) manage and provide incentives to encourage 
voluntary enhancement of significant sites and others. But 
an unspecified ‘all encompassing approach’ avoiding ‘site 
protection which often proves confrontational’ (pp. 3–4) 
closely resembles the comforting but mythical idea that 
‘integration’ of ecological and economic concerns can 
exist without trade-offs (Murray & Swaffield 1994). We 
do not disparage education and altruism, but economics 
suggests these cannot fix the compulsive (non-voluntary) 
problem of ongoing decline (Hardin 1968). Further, the 
capacity, information, and agency culture required to build 
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the proposed ‘comprehensive system’ seem unlikely in 
local authorities ‘lacking natural resource information 
and the finances to collect it’ (Norton & Roper-Lindsay 
2004, p. 296) and relying on occasional expert advice to 
minimise biodiversity transaction costs. 
Second, non-vested interests would bear the burden 
of uncertainty that experts hired by vested interests and 
local authorities will be objective, precautionary, and 
act in their interest. Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) 
repeatedly claim that their criteria are ‘objective’ (pp. 
296, 298, 299, 300, 301, 303), yet also advocate that 
expert knowledge should overcome many acknowledged 
difficulties, make final decisions, and interpret vague and 
ambiguous guidelines. An assessor’s ‘knowledge’ (e.g. pp. 
300, 301) does not render her opinion objective. Thus, the 
criteria of Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) depend deeply 
on the ‘1960s myth’ (Murray & Swaffield 1994, p. 50; 
see also Hays 1959; McFarland 2004) that an assessor’s 
opinions are rational, comprehensive (Kuhn 1962), and 
capable of ‘objectively’ determining a site’s significance 
(Davies 1986). Also, experts (and their opinions) are 
often selected (and excluded) according to one’s interest. 
Professional standards can restrain bias, but ‘professional’ 
experts serving client interests outside the ambit of peer 
review have little incentive to adhere to professional 
norms, and may not do so (Wilson 1989, pp. 60–61). 
While this is true of professionals serving any interest, it 
is particularly unwise to depend on experts proclaiming 
solutions in which they, and/or their client, have a 
financial interest. In sum, dependence on purportedly 
neutral and objective experts in significance assessment 
may lend an unwarranted appearance of scientific rigour 
to ambiguous criteria and subjective decision-making. 
At variance with the precautionary principle, this could 
legitimise decidedly subjective decisions and render 
decision-making impervious to challenge by those deemed 
too ‘non-expert’ (and by implication, ill-informed and 
irrational) to participate.
Significance assessment to halt indigenous biodiversity 
decline 
Having considered equity, we suggest local authorities 
should consider their biodiversity goal and the ecological 
consequences of adopting different criteria sets. In 
other words, they should ask: (1) What is the goal for 
biodiversity? (2) How much biodiversity do we have 
left? (3) How much do we wish to retain? (4) If we are 
to meet this goal, then how must we define significance? 
We offer some suggestions.
What is the goal for biodiversity?
Local authorities represent vested- and non-vested-
interest constituents, but their RMA functions include ‘the 
maintenance of indigenous biological diversity’ (RMA 
§30 and §31) and to sustain ‘…the potential of natural 
[biological diversity] resources…to meet the reasonably 
foreseeable needs of future generations’ (RMA §5). In our 
view, these functions are consistent with the NZBS Goal 
3 for biodiversity, to maintain a full range of indigenous 
biological diversity and enable its persistence (and 
continued evolution) into the future. To maintain biological 
diversity means to change from ‘the current decline to a 
level of stabilisation’ (DOC & MfE 2000, p. 8) or, in other 
words, to halt the loss and simplification of the biological 
diversity that now remains in the landscape.
If we are to meet this goal, then how must we define 
significance?
We would regard a site that is important to achieve 
maintenance of biological diversity as ‘significant’. This 
contrasts with the narrower assumption of Norton and 
Roper-Lindsay (2004) that significance indicates ‘the 
cream’ (p. 296). We see the key question as: ‘is this site 
important for the maintenance of biological diversity into 
the future?’, and not ‘is this site the cream?’
Our definition (and question) requires a future-looking 
concept of representativeness that explicitly incorporates 
the goal of long-term maintenance of biological diversity, 
and advances beyond a notion that past New Zealand 
ecosystems can and should be fossilised. We suggest a 
concept that:
(1) Recognises that ecosystems are dynamic, 
and accepts that change – evolutionary, climatic, 
successional, cyclical, seasonal, meteorological, and 
stochastic – is an inherent property of ecosystems 
(2) Has regard for the abiotic (physical) and biotic 
(ecological and evolutionary) processes that sustain 
biological diversity across the landscape and in aquatic 
systems, not just in specific sites 
(3) Recognises potential for ecological restoration 
in fragmented landscapes and environments where 
the original vegetated cover has been significantly 
reduced
Maintenance of biological diversity (i.e. future 
representativeness) requires protection of the long-term 
capacity of a landscape to support species populations. 
Survival of inherently dynamic ecosystems and their 
component species will not be achieved by preservation 
of a few isolated ‘high quality’ sites, and elimination of 
less pristine (and more vulnerable) remaining ecosystems 
and truncation of remaining species metapopulations. This 
outcome will not maintain the ‘variability among living 
organisms, and the ecological complexes of which they are 
a part, including diversity within species, between species, 
and of ecosystems’ (RMA §2). Fragmentation, loss of 
connectivity, and the consequent disruption of processes 
and metapopulations appear to accelerate rapidly once 
indigenous habitat in a landscape decreases below about 
30% of original cover (e.g. Andrén 1994; Fahrig 2002). 
Incremental losses of habitat matter more once habitat loss 
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has become advanced in a landscape: progressive losses 
have increasingly serious effects on species diversity and 
ecological processes (e.g. Tilman et al. 1994; Rosenzweig 
1995; Hanski 1998). 
Sites ‘…containing high biodiversity values and 
exhibiting a good range of healthy ecosystem processes’ 
(Roper-Lindsay & Norton 2005, p. 3) that remain mainly 
in New Zealand’s cold, wet, steep places are important 
for biodiversity. They are significant by either of our 
definitions. But in landscapes where indigenous habitats 
have been most extensively cleared in the past, and remain 
under the greatest development pressure today (Walker 
et al. 2006), the questions ‘is this site important for the 
maintenance of biological diversity?’ and ‘is this site the 
cream?’ will usually yield different answers. The former 
question would reveal most, if not all remaining indigenous 
habitats to have value, whereas the latter would recognise 
postage stamps, or perhaps even nothing at all.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose that difficulties in defining 
significance in the RMA arise from the ambiguity of 
the statute. This enables different interests to (legally) 
define significance differently, in a manner consistent 
with their goals.
We conclude there are persuasive reasons for local 
authorities to consider questions of equity when adopting 
biodiversity significance criteria. Criteria serving vested 
interests feature high bars for significance and/or pernicious 
qualifiers. These leave little indigenous biodiversity off-
limits to development, and place the burden of risk of 
harm to biological diversity on non-vested interests. 
To serve non-vested interests, local authorities would 
need to manage the uncertainty inherent in significance 
assessment by adopting inclusive and precautionary 
criteria and guidelines that place the uncertainty burden 
on developers.
We also suggest that local authorities consider the 
ecological outcomes of the significance criteria they 
adopt and apply. In recognising few sites as significant 
by dint of having restrictive criteria, they are likely to 
promote ongoing, cumulative loss and simplification of 
the biological diversity that now remains in the landscape. 
Ecological theory and empirical studies indicate restrictive 
criteria with arbitrary high bars and qualifiers will exclude 
sites that require protection if a full range of biological 
diversity is to persist; we suggest such criteria cannot 
be described as ‘ecologically sound’ (Norton & Roper-
Lindsay 2004, p. 298).
In contrast to other areas of the law, most modern 
environmental law consists of (1) ambiguous, discretionary 
concepts that are socially acceptable because they favour 
‘business as usual’, and (2) lists of prohibitions for particular 
narrow situations that permit environmental harm in all 
others (Birnie & Boyle 2002, pp. 44–47; Pardy 2005). 
In significance assessment under the RMA, ‘sustainable 
management’ provides the former (an ambiguous 
concept that promotes business as usual); Norton and 
Roper-Lindsay’s (2004) criteria appear to propose the 
latter (prohibitions limited to narrow situations). Neither 
effectively protects the environment. Rather, both facilitate 
cumulative environmental degradation (Armstrong 2001; 
Pardy 2005). In New Zealand, the devolution of natural 
resource decision-making authority and case-by-case 
subjective decisions on what constitutes ‘balance’ might 
appear participatory and hence democratic, but are not 
(see Pardy 1997, p. 72). Devolution and case-by-case 
decisions will predictably intensify the dominance 
of vested development interests and further facilitate 
cumulative damage to environmental public goods, 
including indigenous biodiversity. 
We are aware of the political impasse that leads to 
the above approaches. If the alternative – a mutually 
coercive rule (Hardin 1968; Pardy 2001) – were politically 
palatable, it would surely be in place. We agree with 
Norton and Roper-Lindsay (2004) that it is the role of 
ecologists neither to presume where the public interest 
in biodiversity lies, nor to prescribe the ‘right’ criteria to 
achieve some purportedly ‘acceptable’, or ‘balanced’ level 
of maintenance or decline. But we can state what seems 
obvious to us. The idea that New Zealand can maintain 
its biological diversity while continuing to draw down 
its already depleted stock of indigenous ecosystems has 
no foundation in ecological science. For local authorities 
to fulfil their RMA function to provide for maintenance 
of indigenous biological diversity, they would need, 
for a start, to halt the ongoing clearance of indigenous 
vegetation and loss of habitats of indigenous species. 
This means capping loss at current levels. In significance 
assessment, this would require a simple general rule such 
as the following: ‘remaining indigenous vegetation and 
habitats of indigenous species are significant’. If the intent 
is to allow biodiversity decline, but merely to slow the rate 
of decline, then local authorities would need significance 
criteria that are broad and inclusive. Such criteria would 
neither set high bars nor include irrelevant qualifiers. 
They would need to be inclusive enough to recognise 
the national importance of a diverse range of remaining 
indigenous vegetation and habitats of indigenous species, 
including the highly modified and the relatively pristine, 
the seral and primary (old growth), the dynamic and 
changing, different patch sizes and configurations, those 
species that are still apparently common and those in all 
stages of decline. 
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